This paper reports a study of veri cation in the high-level design phase of operating system development in which both rigorous and formal veri cation are used, where the rigorous argument is used to determine a manageable formal proof to be carried out. A 2-sorted rst order temporal language is used to express several possible high-level designs and the required properties of an operating system store manager. The case of large system limits is reduced to a case of small system limits by use of a rigorous argument. Corresponding propositional temporal logic PTL formulae are then veri ed using a PTL theorem prover.
Introduction
Software development is recognised as being highly complex and thus error-prone. The general aim of software engineering techniques is to ensure the production of correct and reliable software that meets requirements. The validation of these requirements is a major aspect of software engineering. There are many approaches to validation, one of which being the use of formal methods to provide some form of veri cation.
Formal methods have long been proposed as an antidote to some of the complexity of system design and validation. The proposed use of formality ranges from speci cation of requirements through to full-blown veri cation of systems with increasing cost, time and e ort. For safety-critical systems there has been a recognition of the value, indeed necessity, of formality a t various stage of development. Increasingly as computer systems become mission-critical for business, it is being recognised that 24 hours, 7 days a week up-time is required. Such up-time mean impacts the underlying hardware and systems software. Generally for hardware, such availability is ensured by techniques such as duplication of component. In software a number of approaches are available at implementation level such as triple modular redundancy. Nevertheless such does not detract from the need for better methods of validation and veri cation.
In terms of operating system development of enterprise servers, it is becoming increasingly necessary to provide some formal treatment of validation and veri cation. Such systems play a critical role in the provision of service, and are highly complex: they often have real-time components, deal with an unpredictable load, handle security of information, tend to have v ery long installation lives 30+ years, and address a large and, at design-time, unknown set of application requirements. Perhaps most of all, they exhibit as an integral design rationale the presence of concurrency: many of the techniques and notations for reasoning about concurrency semaphores, conditional critical regions, monitors, CSP etc arose in the context of operating system design.
The authors' role in the development of two industrial-scale operating systems was to consider the most cost-e ective and useful role of formal methods, given a small amount of human resource. In such a system, whilst it is potentially desirable to provide full-blown veri cation to the level of source code, to meet the cost of developing theorem provers or proof assistants that would be practical for use with the particular system is simply impossible due to resource constraints. The emphasis of the formal process therefore should be on the formal speci cation of requirements and the rigorous veri cation of design properties. A rigorous veri cation uses arguments that a mathematically educated person could understand and accept as constituting a valid proof. It need not be presented entirely symbolically with every minute step of an argument justi ed by use of a computer, as is the case with a formal proof.
An issue arises as to how t o v alidate high level design: one approach is to test the developed system to see if the system and thus the high-level design to which the implemented system should correspond has certain required properties. The approach here is to provide proofs for certain cases so that the high-level design can be evaluated at design time. Rather than argue whether the approach here constitutes testing or veri cation, we suggest that the common aim of both testing and the approach here is to validate that the developed system satis es requirements.
This paper discusses an approach to formal speci cation and veri cation derived from work on these industrial-scale projects. In the context of the operating system design and development, the approach i s cost-e ective at providing rigorous analysis of design properties before embarking upon costly and di cultto-change implementation. The method allows a rstorder temporal language to be used abstractly at the speci cation stage, yet requires only a propositional temporal logic theorem prover to be used to verify properties of the system. The paper is structured as follows: x2 describes the approach within the context of operating system design and development; in x3 store manager designs are speci ed in a 2-sorted rst order temporal language; the reduction of these speci cations to simple propositional temporal formulae is given in x4; in x5 the veri cation of the PTL properties using temporal logic theorem provers is discussed; Finally, further work and conclusions are discussed in x6. 2 A Practical Approach to Speci cation and Veri cation of Design
As with other software developers, operating system designers express and document requirements using natural language. It is important that when these high-level design requirements are expressed formally the correspondence between informal and formal is transparent to the designers.
A t ypical such speci cation involves processes and various shared resource types, as seen in 4 and 7 . The system is naturally speci ed in a rst order temporal language representing a large number of processes and resource instances corresponding to the system limits. Following this speci cation activity, there is a need for verify properties of the system design. In view of the problem of using theorem provers at the actual system limits, the alternatives to full-blown formal veri cation appear to be: The style of veri cation using a rigorous argument involves the use of much less detailed proof and provides much of the bene t of formal proof gained at a much lower cost. From this point of view the rst approach might be advised. However, there are two reasons why a formal element to the proof should be considered at the highlevel design phase:
1. A greater assurance of correctness may be desired at the high-level design phase of system development because of the greater cost of incorrectness at this level. 2. The smaller amount of detail at the higher level actually makes it more practically viable for automated formal proof than lower levels of design. If greater assurance is required then approach C may be considered, where a rigorous proof is accompanied by a formal proof of the temporal formulae resulting from giving small values to the number of processes and resource instances. The question is which small values should be given for the number of processes and resource instances if the formal proof is to reinforce the rigorous proof? The proof with the chosen values is useless if it does not re ect the case of large values.
As a consequence, the following approach, D, is proposed which combines the bene ts of both rigorous and formal proof, and where the formal proof is a logical extension of the rigorous argument. A practical case study is given here to demonstrate how this approach can be used at the high-level design phase of operating system development. The context is the design methodology in 7 which analysed the informal design processes that took place in the highlevel design of two industrially linked parallel operating systems projects -the UK Alvey Flagship project 6 and the Esprit EDS project 9 . As a result of this a design process to be put in place at the high-level design phase of system development w as formulated. A feature of this design process is the use of a design space language BSL 'Binding Strategy Language', which aims to provide some sort of guidance as to the design options. The later stages of the design process suggest formal veri cation of required properties of viable designs before the costly task of implementation is embarked upon. Precisely, the design process means formally specifying each design the 'binding', the system that it will run on the 'architectural constraints' and the required properties, and then verifying that the overall design+system has the required properties.
The case study is of the design of a store manager. This will involve:
1. Specifying the design, system and properties for di erent store managers in a rst-order temporal language; 2. Showing that validity for temporal formulae corresponding to actual system limits is equivalent to validity for valuations in a certain small case; 3. Verifying the formulae for the small case using a theorem prover. It should be noted that the approach described does not help with nding required properties but rather verifying and validating them, and in a wider context achieving these properties in a developed system. The assumption is that the designers by experience and consideration have expressed the required properties -of course consistency of store is a major property for an operating system. Related work on reducing large system limits to small values includes 2 and 8 . The contribution here is doing so in the context of the use of temporal logic in the high-level design of operating systems.
3 Formal Speci cation of Store Manager Designs
The rst order temporal language used in this section, FLTL-2, is a 2-sorted language with time dependent predicates; for further language details the interested reader is directed to 5 . The language is easily understood by operating system designers in that FLTL-2 formulae correspond closely to the informal English description. At a high-level, store management comprises:
user processes a system process a store map a p h ysical store The idea is that there is a shared virtual address space such that each user process accesses virtual store by rst accessing the store map to nd which p h ysical address corresponds to a virtual address, and then the user process accesses the physical store.
The system process also accesses the store map and physical store in order to reorganise the store. This might be an access by the system process to change the store map, later followed by an access by the system to physical store, so that the new physical addresses of virtual addresses, receive the data that the old physical addresses of those virtual addresses contained.
The temporal speci cation of the store manager designs, the architectural constraints and the required properties involve specifying the sequence of events in time that each allows to occur. The events which are accesses to the store map and physical store are assumed to last the duration of a single point in time. Overall, the events that may o r m a y not be occurring at a given point i n time break down into statements about processes and the store map. These are treated as two sorts N and M respectively in the use of FLTL-2. The M-sorted predicate sm, the N-sorted predicates usm and uph, and the propositions ssm and sph have the following meaning: usmn: user process n is accessing the store map uphn: user process n is accessing physical store smm: the m-th store map is in operation ssm: the system process is accessing the store map sph: the system process is accessing physical store A pleasant feature of temporal logic is that speci cations can be appreciated with only the following brief description of the temporal operators 1 :
1 Equivalence of informal and formal speci cation cannot be proved, however, it is possible to consider subjectively how clear is the correspondence between informal and formal. To assess this, a formalism needs to be tried: here the correspondence of the formal temporal logic to the informal English "looks good". 2 An architecture of a system can be de ned abstractly in terms of the properties that the system should exhibit. In this context the system is the store manager. Notice that it is allowed for the system to access physical store when the user is accessing the store map. This might occur if the system is completing its latest reorganisation of store by performing the necessary physical store updates corresponding to changes it made to the virtual to real address store map earlier on. It is safe for a user to access the new store map at this point as a subsequent access by the user to physical store will occur after the system has nished with the physical store and will pick up the corresponding new state of the physical store.
System 2 Architecture
System 2 has all the architectural constraints constr1 to constr10 and has the additional constraint that, after a change to the store map by the system, a user cannot access physical store until that user has observed accessed this store map constr11 def = 2 ssm 8 n::uphnUusmn
First Design Option
A design option comprises a speci cation of the initial conditions and the 'binding' in the terminology of 7 . The initial conditions for the rst design are that the rst two users access the store map without a need for an intervention by the system init1 def = 9n 1 9n 2 : :n 1 = n 2 ^usmn 1 ^ usmn 2 The 'binding' condition states that if the user accesses the store map, the next access by the user will be to physical store at some later point in time bind U smph 3 def = 8n: 2 usmn :usmnUuphn
Second Design Option
In the second design, the initial conditions are that rst a user accesses the store map, and then the second user accesses the store map at some later point in time not necessarily immediately 
Required Properties
The required safety property of the overall system is that the store is kept consistent. In other words, if a user accesses a store map, then the next access to physical store cannot occur when a di erent store map is in operation if the user has not accessed the store map in the meantime. This is expressed by the following equation prop def = 8n8m: 2 usmn^smm ::usmn: uphnUuphn: smm 3.6 Proof Obligations
The three proof obligations that will be considered are as follows. Firstly, to see if the rst design running on System 1 satis es the required properties. For this, it is necessary to show that eq1 def = init1^bind U smphV 10 i=1 constr i prop 3 The subscript uses the notation of BSL, a language for generating design options. By a design option we mean a plausible design of a system. The role of a design option is to direct the designer at the next level of design 7 . 4 Notice that, here, the subscript associates to the right, whereas in the rst design option the subscript associated to the left. 
Rigirous Argument
The next stage of the process involves: 1. producing a rigorous argument that reduces the speci cation to one with a small number of processes and resource instances; 2. providing the propositional temporal logic formulae corresponding to these small number of processes and resource instances.
Reduction to Small System Limits
For our case study, this involves showing that that the proof obligations of x3-eq1, eq2 and eq3 -are each valid for the actual system limits if and only if they are valid for the case of 2 store maps and 2 processes. Precisely, this means proving rigorously:
i j = iM ;iN eq1 , j = 2;2 eq1 ii j = iM ;iN eq2 , j = 2;2 eq2 iii j = iM ;iN eq3 , j = 2;2 eq3 where j = ; eq denotes validity of the FLTL-2 formula eq interpreted over domains of cardinality and for the two sorts M and N respectively. The integers i M and i N are the actual system limits in our case study. The rigorous argument for i, ii and iii is too large to include here but represents 3-4 pages of hand-proof. The interested reader is referred to 5 for the full details.
Propositional Formulae for Small System Limits
This involves listing the propositional temporal formulae corresponding to the formulae in x3 for the case of 2 users and 2 store maps. The three equations eq1, eq2, and eq3 were run on the dp temporal theorem prover 3 . dp is a decision procedure for a future linear time temporal logic over in nite time models. In the way it is used here dp attempts to show that a given formula is valid, i.e. that its negation has no model. Readers interested in the detailed output of dp are referred to 5 , here a part of the veri cation is given.
Propositional Variables
Using dp involves having to prepare the temporal logic formulae in an input le according to the dp syntax as follows: Given this translation, dp informs the user as to the validity of the entered formula. The output from dp has been laid out slightly di erently for appearance purposes. In addition, dp inserts left associating brackets. Thus A&B&C&D is displayed instead of A&B&C&D Apart from this, the correspondence between formulae in dp and those given in x4 should be obvious. prop, w as shown to be invalid. Recall this is the design that states that if the user accesses the store map, the next access by the user will be to the physical store at some later point in time. System 1 is de ned as the set of constraints, const1,...,constr10 . The interaction with the theorem prover was as follows: prop, was also shown to be valid. Recall this is the same design as eq1 speci es, except there is an additional architectural constraint, constr11, which serves to make the design valid.
Summary
It has thus been shown that the rst design option is invalid with System 1 but is valid with System 2, where System 2 is equivalent to System 1 with the addition of constr11. The second design option has been shown to be valid for System 1.
Conclusions and Further Work
Within the context of industrial-scale operating system development, the use of a formal treatment is increasingly considered essential. The question is more where can the necessarily limited resource for formal approaches be used for most bene t?
Here a method has been presented for verifying requirements expressed in temporal logic by using both a rigorous and a formal proof. The rigorous argument has been used to determine the appropriate formal proof to be discharged. The temporal logic used FLTL-2, although having a rst-order language, has an intended interpretation over the actual operating system limits which are large but nevertheless nite. This makes FLTL-2 decidable even for the actual system limits and means that in theory designs could be proved correct without recourse to any rigorous argument. In practice even the most powerful temporal logic theorem provers have a far more modest capability and would be of little use in producing such a proof. The method here enables use to be made of such theorem provers to bene t the correctness of the design. Indeed, the machine proofs of the case study in this paper were carried out on a small in-house theorem prover. The approach appears both cost-e ective and thorough. Tool support is envisaged for the production of the PTL formulae based on the FLTL-2 formula and the numbers of processes and resources derived in the rigorous argument. Similarly, tool support to translate the form of PTL used here to that used as input of a particular theorem prover is also envisaged.
The case study example, whist small enough to be described here, is complex enough to involve concurrent and di erent levels of users. Other case studies with this method are being considered, for example a weakened requirements prop has been suggested, and distributed store management is under consideration. Following these, it is hoped that heuristics for the type of rigorous argument required for concurrent system development m a y be derived.
